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PRESERVING POLITICAL SPEECH FROM OURSELVES
AND OTHERS
Aziz Z. Huq*

A central concern in First Amendment jurisprudence is the proper scope
of government authority to regulate speech on matters of national political
concern.1 Such speech supposedly secures heightened protection via a "strict
scrutiny" test long glossed as "fatal in fact." 2 Strict scrutiny is thought to
demand that measures be "'narrowly tailored"' to address a "'compelling
government interest.' 3 Recent scholarship, however, has demonstrated that
strict scrutiny is internally variegated. Under its rubric, courts employ different
methodologies 4 and varying degrees of stringency. 5 Courts also subtly alter the
verbal formulation of scrutiny even within the political speech domain.
This Essay is a case study of how the heightened judicial scrutiny of
political speeh regulation can vary even between cases decided by a single
tribunal-the Roberts Court. Two lines of jurisprudence from that tribunal
implicate political speech. First, the Court has invalidated several state and
federal campaign finance laws. 6 Second, it has upheld a federal statute
Assistant Professor of Law. University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Emily
Berman, Justin Levitt, Faiza Sayed, and Geof Stone for insightful comments. I am also pleased to
acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund. All errors, however, are mine
alone.
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) ("The Free
Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters .... .).
2. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972).
3. Johnson v. California. 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors. Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); accord Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) ("To satisfy
strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that [the] legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.").
4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1301-11 (2007)
(arguing strict scrutiny might be characterized as categorical rule, weighted balancing test, or
heuristic to identify measures animated by unconstitutional ends).
5. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 796-97 (2006) (finding, based on survey of
cases, about one in three laws survive strict scrutiny challenges, but survival rate varies according
to right at issue).
6. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011)
(invalidating matching subsidy element in Arizona's public financing system): Citizens United v.
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criminalizing "material support" to designated foreign terrorist organizations
("FTOs"). 7 These lines of precedent are more alike, I will argue, than first
appearances suggest. Both can be colorably read to involve state efforts to
regulate the national political marketplace. Both also implicate a compelling
government interest in preserving democracy, albeit from distinct internal and
external threats. Yet doctrinal propinquity yields no convergence in outcomes.
In the Roberts Court, the government prevails when defending democracy
against external threats but loses against internal corruption.
My aim here is to examine the common doctrinal matrix of First
Amendment scrutiny of political speech regulation to explain how such
divergent results can emerge from a unified analytic framework (rather than,
say, to explore how exogenous political or social forces might be used to
explain the doctrine). A secondary goal is to illustrate how post-9/11 national
security concerns find expression inside familiar and seemingly durable
doctrinal frameworks. I begin in Part I by briefly sketching the two lines of
cases. Part 11 examines how and why the severity of the Court's scrutiny
modulates across the two contexts. Part III then demonstrates that even when
the Court applies the same formal decision rule across cases, that rule can have
divergent downstream effects. I conclude on a note of skepticism about the
possible justifications for observed intradoctrinal variances.
I.
Initially, the Supreme Court sorted campaign finance laws into
(permissible) regulation of contributions to candidates or parties on the one
hand, and (impermissible) regulation of independent expenditures on the
other. 8 The Court explained that "[r]estraints on expenditures generally curb
more expressive associational activity than limits on contributions do" while
"limits on contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political
corruption." 9 Yet a moment's reflection suggests that the line between
spending oneself and giving money to a candidate is hardly self-evident in
practice: What if instead of donating money to candidates, I contact them to
see what kind of advertising they need and proceed accordingly?
Acknowledging this fuzzy edge, the Court draws a "functional, not a formal,
line" between truly independent expenditures and expenditures with a
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating federal bar on corporate and union expenditures on
election-related speech close to date of polling); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759. 2774 (2008)
(invalidating so-called millionaire's amendment in federal campaign finance law): FEC v. Wisc.
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2663-66 (2007) (accepting as-applied challenge to bar on
corporate speech close to elections).
7. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 130 S. Ct. 2705. 2730-31 (2010) (rejecting asapplied challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), one of several material support
provisions).
8. Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1974) (per curiam) (invalidating independent
expenditure limitation provision of Federal Election Campaign Finance Act of 1971); see also
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377. 386-88 (2000) (noting contribution limits "would
more readily clear the hurdles before them"): FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.. 479 U.S. 238.
259-60 (1986) ("We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less
compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.").
9. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431. 440-41 (2001).
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candidate's "approval (or wink or nod)."l 0 The latter count as contributions.
Hence, the truly important doctrinal distinction-the de facto boundary
between highly protected speech and vulnerability to campaign finance
regulation-is between independent and coordinatedspeech.
On both sides of the independent/coordinated divide, the Roberts Court
has innovated in a deregulatory direction. Early in the new Chief's tenure, the
Court invalidated Vermont limits on individual contributions to political
candidates as beneath "some lower bound" of constitutionality.11 On the
independent expenditure side of the line, Citizens United v. FEC struck down a
federal bar upon the use of corporate funds for electioneering
communications.1 2 And in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, the Court invalidated an Arizona public financing scheme in which
a privately funded candidate's decision to exceed a stated expenditure ceiling
triggered increased funding for candidates supported by the public purse. 13 To
many commentators who favor campaign finance reform, these decisions
seemed to sound a death knell for the comprehensive regulation of money in
politics. After Citizens United, some argued, independent entities such as
political action committees and 527 organizations 1 4 would become vehicles for
unlimited spending, fostering a surfeit of what some perceive to be undesirable
bonds of obligation between office holders and a limited pool of unaccountable
interest groups.15
Importantly, a careful and exacting form of scrutiny applies, albeit in
different ways, on each side of the independent/coordinated divide. On the one
hand, the Court reviews independent expenditure restrictions under a truly
strict scrutiny standard. 16 For example, Citizens United catalogued the absence
of evidence that corporate expenditures were being exchanged for legislative

10. Id. at 442-43. The FEC takes the position that "extensive consultations with the
campaign staff of certain candidates regarding the distribution of its voter guides and other
materials" can turn "otherwise permissible campaign-related materials into illegal in-kind
campaign contributions." FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1999).
"Coordination" is defined by regulation. 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 1(a) (2011).
11. Randall v. Sorrell. 548 U.S. 230, 246-62 (2006) (invalidating limitations on individual
political contributions to candidates of between $200 and $400).
12. 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
13. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813-16 (2011). This is not entirely accurate. Independent third-party
expenditures on behalf of a privately funded candidate also triggered the match. Id.
14. Tax-exempt entities formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006) for the purpose of political
lobbying.
15. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Reform as We Know It, 98 Va. L.
Rev.
(forthcoming
2012)
(manuscript
at
36-38).
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1829474 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing "[w]ith the opportunities for unlimited independent expenditures by outside
groups, we are likely to see political actors re-focusing away from grass-roots mobilization ...
back to a focus on a relatively small group of ultra-wealthy donors"). But see Samuel Issacharoff,
On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 142 (2010) ("Citizens United is a distraction of
limited consequence."); Justin Levitt. Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 217. 220-22 (2011) ("Citizens United invalidated the federal ban on corporations'
ability to advocate expressly for or against political candidates, but it did not portend the
complete collapse of other campaign finance regulation.").
16. Citizens United. 130 S. Ct. at 898.
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votes. 17 Acknowledging the Court's "due deference" to Congress's conclusion
that a compelling interest exists, Justice Kennedy's opinion nevertheless
emphasized that the Court would ensure that "Congress . .. not choose an
unconstitutional remedy."1 8 He underscored the absence of harmful corruption
in twenty-six states without corporate expenditure restrictions as evidence of
narrow tailoring's absence. 19
By contrast, coordinated expenditure regulations that impose a
"'significant interference"' on speech rights must only be "'closely drawn"' to
match a "'sufficiently important interest."' 2 0 This is a looser formulation than
the scrutiny applied to expenditure controls, although one that still demands
close means-ends tailoring. Even on the contribution side of the line, the Court
has not suggested it is applying anything less than careful scrutiny given the
political speech interests at stake, although it certainly tends to uphold most
regulation of campaign-related giving. 2 1
In contrast to the campaign finance jurisprudence, the ledger of Roberts
Court cases involving restrictions on speech justified on national security
grounds has exactly one entry. In the 2010 case Holder v. HumanitarianLaw
Project (HLP), the Court turned aside as-applied First Amendment challenges
to one of several statutes criminalizing "material support" for terrorism. 2 2 The
material support statute plays a significant role in many criminal prosecutions
involving terrorism. 2 3 The challenged statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, is keyed to a
list of foreign groups designated by the Secretary of State as FTOs. 24 Lending
FTOs any one of a diverse list of "support or resources" is prohibited. 25 As the
facts of HLP show, material support reaches (but is not limited to) First
Amendment-protected speech. For instance, the HLP plaintiffs were U.S.based not-for-profits wishing to train members of designated FTOs
(specifically, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tamil
Tigers of Eelam (LTTE)) on humanitarian and international law, on political
advocacy techniques, and about the petitioning of international bodies. 26
The Court, having turned aside the HLP plaintiffs' statutory interpretation
and vagueness arguments, rejected an as-applied free speech challenge to
17.
instance,
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 910-11. Arguably, the Court's contextual analysis is vulnerable on the facts, for
in its treatment of corporate democracy. Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 908-09.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (quoting Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1.25 (1976)).
21. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 847-48 (noting zero percent survival rate of expenditure
limits in federal appellate courts).
22. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
23. Ctr. for Law & Sec., N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law. Terrorist Trial Report Card, September
II,
2001 -September
II,
2010,
at
13
tig.
14
(2011),
available
at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01 TTRC2010Finall.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing use of material support in high-profile prosecutions).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006) (authorizing Secretary of State, in consultation with Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury. to designate foreign group as "foreign terrorist
organization").
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (listing forms of
material support).
26. HLP. 130 S. Ct. at 2716.

20

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW SIDEBAR

Vol. 112:16

§ 2339B. 27 Chief Justice Robert's majority opinion does not explicitly set forth
the strict scrutiny standard or employ the precise terminology of "narrow
tailoring." But the Court opened its analysis by rejecting the Solicitor
General's submission that intermediate scrutiny applied on the ground that
"§ 2339B regulates speech on the basis of its content." 2 8 The Court
conspicuously did not cite cases reviewing conduct regulations with only an
incidental effect on speech, 29 which it might have invoked to resolve the case
expeditiously in the government's favor. Subsequently, lower courts have
concluded that "[t]he Court held that strict scrutiny applied because, at least on
the facts of that case, the statute regulated speech because of its content." 30 For
the purpose of this paper, I accept this characterization, bracketing the question
of how an incidental-effects analysis would arguendo apply. 3 1
At the threshold, Chief Justice Roberts dealt summarily with the
compelling interest question. He explained that "the Government's interest in
combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order." 32 He
identified no other compelling government interest. In lieu of a narrow
tailoring analysis, the Court focused upon one of the implicit premises of the
blanket ban on supporting FTOs: that "any contribution to such an organization
facilitates [violence]." 33 This premise, the Court suggested, underpinned
Congress's decision to treat even nonviolent support, including the HLP

27. Id. at 2716-17, 2730 (noting not all applications of material support statute were before
Court).
28. Id. at 2723 24 & n.5 ("If plaintiffs' speech to those groups imparts a 'specific skill' or
communicates advice derived from 'specialized knowledge' . . . then it is barred. . . . On the other

hand, plaintiffs' speech is not barred if it imparts only general or unspecialized knowledge.").
One might object that § 2339B is most accurately described as drawing distinctions based on the
intended audience of speech. and not on the content of the speech itself That formulation
collapses back into the question whether the government is entitled to distinguish between speech
based on judgments about different potential audiences.
29. See. e.g., United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367. 367 (1968) (reviewing and upholding
application of federal statute making it illegal to burn a selective service registration card).
30. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. 10-35032, 2011 WL
4424934, at *26 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011).
3 1. In my view, the Court was correct not to employ the O'Brien incidental effects
framework. Briefly, my reasons for this judgments turn on the simple fact that "material support"
has been defined by Congress to include a long list of activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)
(2006) (defining "material support" as "any property. tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance. safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment. facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel .... and transportation,
except medicine or religious materials"). Many of these activities are clearly not speech. Others,
such as "advice" and "training." clearly are. And it is at least plausible to think Congress included
those elements with an aim of eliminating domestic speech supportive of the viewpoint of FTOs.
To apply the incidental effects analysis would, in effect, reward Congress for bundling speech
and nonspeech prohibitions together, thereby reducing the judicial scrutiny of legislative efforts at
speech suppression. The Court may rightly have perceived that application of O'Brien would
have created an undesirable incentive for Congress to bundle together speech and nonspeech rules
in the future.
32. HLP. 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
33. Id. at 2724 25 (emphasis omitted) (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132. § 301(a)(7). 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended
as note to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B)).
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plaintiffs' speech, as criminal. The Court identified three reasons why
"Congress was justified" in that view. 34 First, it posited that "[m]oney is
fungible," and terrorist organizations lack organizational firewalls to prevent
resource diversions. 35 On this point, the Court invoked a 1997 incident
involving the PKK and quoted from a 2006 monograph about the Palestinian
group Hamas to support the proposition that FTOs used social and charitable
activities to hide illegal activity and to generate recruits for violence. 3 6 The
Court also hypothesized that the HLP plaintiffs' speech might allow the PKK
to employ international organizations "to threaten, manipulate and disrupt"
political processes. 37
Second, the Court found that the proscribed forms of material support
"hel[p] lend legitimacy" to FTOs. 38 The Court did not define "legitimacy," or
respond to Justice Breyer's observation that many other forms of protected
activity might lend an FTO legitimacy (rendering that justification at the very
least underinclusive and poorly tailored). 39 Third, the Court stated that material
support also "strain[s] the United States' relationships with its allies," who
perceive "no" possibility of "legitimate" FTO activity." 40
Based on these inferences, the Court concluded that the material support
provision could lawfully be applied to any "speech under the direction of, or in
coordination with foreign groups." 4 1 Relevant here, this holding inscribes the
same boundary to protected speech as the campaign finance jurisprudencethe line between independent and coordinated social action. 42
In the plotting of this doctrinal line, a general claim about comparative
institutional competence was as pivotal for the Court as any of the specific
justifications offered for § 2339B. The Court emphasized that the material
support bar rested "on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence" in a
domain in which "Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make
principled distinctions." 43 An extended portion of the opinion then developed
grounds for "deference" not merely to Congress's judgment, but also to the
Executive's conclusions about "evolving threats in an area where information
can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to

34. Id. at 2725.
35. Id. at 2725-26.
36. Id. (citing Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of
Jihad 2-3 (2006)).
37. Id. at 2729. Again, the Court relied on a secondary academic source, rather than specific
record evidence. Id. (citing Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for
Independence 286-95 (2007)).
38. Id. at 2725.
39. Id. at 2736-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2726 (majority opinion) (asserting
coordinated/independent speech line is "a natural stopping place" but not saying why).
40. Id. at 2726-27 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 2723 (emphasis added).
42. Recall that, in the campaign finance context, unprotected "contributions" speech
includes coordinated expenditures. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. The most
important doctrinal distinction in campaign finance law is thus between independent and
coordinated speech.
43. HLP. 130 S. Ct. at 2728.
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assess." 44
Does HLP influence how the national political market operates? On the
one hand, the Court assumed that the speech at issue fell within the core of
First Amendment protection, hinting at some significant stake. Nevertheless,
some commentators have suggested the opinion has only small practical
significance because it does not reach domestic organizations. 4 5 Even casual
observation demonstrates, however, that foreign affairs matters occupy a
meaningful tranche of the national political debate initiated by domestic actors.
Many local and national interest groups are deeply committed to influencing
U.S. policy on foreign affairs matters implicated by FTO designations, from
Ireland and Spain to the Middle East and South Asia. 46 The material support
ban does not stop such advocacy, but it does distort it. That law criminalizes
interaction with foreign entities and thereby influences what domestic interest
groups can know or do. It thus excises from the public sphere some set of
speech. Consider, for example, the designation of Iranian organizations,
including the Mujahedin-e Khaleq (MEK), that oppose the Ahmadinejad
regime. 47 All else being equal, a private supporter of the MEK has ample
reason to lobby Washington: The MEK has substantial congressional support,
if not quite sufficient to shrug off FTO designation. 48 But that supporter has
asymmetrical incentives over the choice of domestic lobbying tools. After
HLP, it cannot consult-and perhaps cannot even meet-the MEK. Nor can it
engage in domestic lobbying based on information thereby acquired. In this
way, the material support ban subtly changes the content and structure of the
national political marketplace by channeling the acquisition of information,
networking investments, and lobbying strategies. The magnitude of this effect,
of course, is hard to determine, although the scope of the Secretary of State's
discretionary designation power and the breadth of resulting prohibitions imply
a large regulatory footprint. Yet such uncertainty does not obviate First
Amendment questions. It may not be clear how the regulation of political
campaign contributions and expenditures affects the speech marketplace, but
still the Court limits legislative action in the name of the First Amendment. So
long as foreign affairs are interwoven in national political affairs, 49 moreover,
the distortive effect of the material support law is likely to persist.
The independent/coordinated line also leaves other traditionally protected

44. Id. at 2727. For another instance of strict scrutiny applied in a way that seems in
retrospect quite deferential, see generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
45. See. e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat. Associational Speech. 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1010 n.150
(2011) (suggesting Court's decision, limited to foreign organizations, affords greater protection to
domestic organizations).
46. See U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (on tile with the Columbia Law Review)
(listing organizations designated as FTOs).
47. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State. 613 F.3d 220. 224-25 & n.2
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing history of MEK's designations).
48. See Scott Shane, Across Party Lines, Lobbying for Iranian Exiles on Terrorist List. Nov.
27. 2011, at Al.
49. Cf. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 947-48 (2011) (criticizing conception of First
Amendment exemplified in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as "provincial").
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speech in legal peril. In oral argument before the Court in HLP, for example,
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan explained that the government believed
that § 2339B extended to lawyers who prepared amicus briefs on behalf of an
FTO. 50 The Court's independent/coordinated distinction thus leaves counsel
wishing to represent FTOs facing uncertainty about their exposure to criminal
liability.
In sum, the Roberts Court's close scrutiny of two kinds of political speech
restrictions yields divergent results. Both strands are organized around the
same boundary line between coordinatedand independent speech. The balance
of this Essay considers the Court's methodology, the mechanics of strict
scrutiny, and the downstream consequences of doctrinal choices for democratic
probity and national security.
II.
The most obvious discontinuity between the campaign finance and
material support cases is their divergent approaches to the factual predicates
for the different laws at issue. 51 Canonical accounts of strict scrutiny
emphasize the close attention courts are supposed to pay to the factual indicia
of narrow tailoring, 52 and contrast it with the looser search for "substantial
evidence" that typifies intermediate tiers of scrutiny. 5 3 An even larger gap
separates the Court's approaches to evidentiary questions in Citizens United
and HLP. While the Citizens United Court pointed to a specific absence of
evidence that the asserted government interest was furthered by the corporate
expenditure ban,5 4 the HLP judgment used a light touch in examining the
government's justifications. 5 5 This Part explores the justifications for that
divide.
To begin, there is an obvious doctrinal explanation. As noted above, there
50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89) ("[Tlo the extent that a lawyer drafts an amicus brief for the
PKK or for the LTTE ... then that indeed would be prohibited."). But see Am. Airways Charter,
Inc. v. Regan. 746 F.2d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding government did not
have power to determine whether lawyer could form an attorney-client relationship with Cuban
government, which was subject to sanctions). Current regulations issued by the Treasury
department under another federal designation statute create safe harbors for lawyers providing
legal services directly to designated entities. See 29 C.F.R. § 403.9 (2011) (exempting attorneyclient communications from disclosure rules).
5 1. Procedural form is an important entailment of the First Amendment in application. Cf.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States. Inc., 466 U.S. 485. 505 (1984) (requiring
appellate courts hearing speech cases to conduct independent review of facts); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) (noting "procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law").
52. See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("Deference
to a legislative funding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.").
53. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180. 208 (1997): see also Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (holding in intermediate scrutiny cases "courts must
accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress").
54. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910-11 (2010).
55. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting absence of "evidence that
Congress has made [an informed] judgment regarding the specific activities at issue in these
cases").
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are divergent standards of strictness in the review of regulations of independent
and coordinated speech. 56 HLP plainly falls into the latter camp. A first cut at
explaining the Court's different approaches in Citizens United and HLP would
thus likely stress the different doctrinal treatment of independent and
coordinated speech.
But this doctrinal explanation does not do sufficient work. This can be
seen most clearly by focusing closely on the HLP case. Even read as an
exercise in determining whether the material support law was "'closely
drawn"' to match a "'sufficiently important interest,"' 5 7 the majority opinion
in HLP falls far short. Chief Justice Roberts endorsed Congress's conclusion
that material support for nonviolent activities "frees up other resources within
the organization that may be put to violent ends." 58 Without asking specifically
whether the plaintiffs' proposed speech acts in HLP could be a substitute for
the support of LTTE or PKK's terrorist activity, 59 the Court focused primarily
on the fungibility of cash transfers (not at issue in the case) for Hamas (also not
implicated in the case). 60 The Court further assumed what was true of Hamas
was necessarily true of other FTOs. But the category of FTOs is not a natural
kind. It is an output from discretionary executive branch policy choice.
Nothing in the statute requires the State Department to bestow FTO status only
when an organization fails to preserve appropriate internal firewalls. What is
true of one FTO's internal structure and operation might therefore not be true
of others. At best, the Court showed the statute's justification was plausible,
not that it was closely drawn. 6 1
Moreover, although the Court framed its analysis around the compelling
interest in "combating terrorism" directed toward the United States, much of
what followed in fact turned on the distinct, foreign-affairs related government
interest in maintaining cordial relations with countries such as Turkey and Sri
Lanka. 62 Chief Justice Roberts thus explained that an absolute ban on material
support to the PKK was warranted because of the risk that Turkey "would react
sharply" to private American support for the Kurdish separatist movement. 63
As Justice Breyer noted, it seems odd to treat "the fact that other nations may
like us less" as a pass to restricting First Amendment speech. 64 At a minimum,
this dispute illustrates the HLP Court's surprisingly cavalier attitude toward the
56. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (describing different standards of review).
57. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
58. HLP. 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
59. The Court speculated that the PKK "could ... pursue peaceful negotiations as a means
of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks." Id. at 2729. Whether or not this is an
accurate reading of the historical record. it is a prediction that relies on a piling of inference upon
inference to reach the conclusion that the HLP plaintiffs' actions could facilitate violence. Nor is
it clear how this conclusion applies to the teaching of international law.
60. Id. at 2726-25.
61. The Court's oblique citations to past behavior of the PKK and LTTE. see id. at 2726.
only partly remedy this gap.
62. Compare id. at 2724 (describing government interest in fighting terror as an "objective
of the highest order"). with id. at 2726 (describing importance of "cooperative efforts between
nations to prevent terrorist attacks").
63. Id. at 2726-27.
64. Id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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government's proclivity for shuffling between putative compelling interests. It
also reflects a surprising inattention to the comparative strength of state
interests that range from preventing terrorist attacks in the United States to
maintaining good relations with states around the Indian Ocean.
In light of these features of the HLP decision, it cannot be said that the
Court's light touch in that case is solely explained by the more relaxed judicial
approach to coordinated speech. Even accounting for that relaxation of
scrutiny, the HLP Court's version of strict scrutiny is strikingly forgiving.
Indeed, it is barely recognizable as First Amendment scrutiny at all given the
Court's express acceptance of loosely defined and evolving governmental
goals on the one hand, and predictions instead of facts on the other.
Other explanations for the deference gap in HLP also founder. The looser
review used in HLP might be defended, for example, by pointing out that
"[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justification raised." 6 5 But both campaign finance laws and
material support provisions respond to problems with long historical pedigrees.
It is not clear one is more familiar or credible than the other.
Alternatively, the Court's dialing down of factual scrutiny in HLP might
be explained as a reflection of the large expected cost of terrorism and the
relatively small expected cost of corruption induced by electoral spending in a
democratic system. 6 6 Stated otherwise, the high stakes of terrorism lead to
greater judicial deference. But this too is not clearly true. It is at least arguable
that the magnitude of terrorism's total social cost for the United States is less
than is generally believed (particularly where the LTTE and PKK( rather than,
say, al Qaeda, are concerned). 67 And it is also not clear why what one scholar
has called "the anti-corruption principle," which has a long and robust pedigree
in American history, should be given such short shrift.6 8 Stated otherwise,
public tolerance for the violent actions of FTOs with a purely foreign reach
might in fact be much greater than zero (think of the IRA), whereas our
constitutional tradition might be glossed to suggest that tolerance for
distortions in political representation from the democratic ideal should be

65. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
66. Even though, as I just observed, the logic of HLP turns as much on foreign policy
concerns that are legitimately subject to domestic democratic contestation as it does on security
from terrorism.
67. There is a tendency to see all terrorist attacks as akin to 9/11. But serious terrorism
incidents comprise a small fraction of the universe of actual terrorism. Since 1978, only 118
incidents of terrorism worldwide have killed more than 100 people. This is only 0. 12% percent of
the 98,000 terrorist events in that period. Nat'l Consortium for the Study & Responses to
Terrorism,
Global
Terrorism
Database,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?startyearonly=1978&endyearonly=2010&st
art_year-&start month &start day=&end year=&end month=&end day=&asmSelect0=&asm
Selectl =&dtp2=all&success-yes&casualties type=f&casualties max= 101http://www.start.umd.e
du/gtd/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
68. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle. 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341,
342 (2009) ("The Constitution carries within it an anti-corruption principle, much like the
separation-of-powers principle, or federalism. It is a freestanding principle embedded in the
Constitution's structure, and should be given independent weight .... ).
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minimal. If the Court's divergent approaches to factual scrutiny do indeed rest
on some implicit hierarchy of the interests furthered respectively by campaign
finance and material support laws, then it is at the very least incumbent on the
Justices to explain how they have prioritized different policy goals, and to
defend that judgment explicitly. The Roberts Court has offered no such
explanation.
Finally, the difference in the Court's approach might be justified on
comparative institutional competence grounds. 69 In HLP, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked the "sensitive and weighty" nature of national security questions, and
the presumption that the political branches are skilled at assessing "evolving
threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain." 70 By contrast,
Roberts Court campaign finance cases are haunted by a pervasive "mistrust of
governmental power" 7 1 and by a specific suspicion that regulation is motivated
by incumbency protection. 72 This asymmetrical economy of suspicion,
however, rests on unconvincing foundations. As an initial matter, both national
security and campaign financing involve government lock-up power. Whatever
expertise the executive might have, this fact alone should raise libertarian red
flags given the possibility of both good and bad actors at the helm of the state.
More to the point, the HLP Court's analysis of the welfare consequences of
terrorism is lopsided. The Court accounts for the pros of political control of
security matters but ignores the long history of constitutional rights violations
premised on perceived foreign threats. 73 It also takes no account of incumbent
politicians' potent incentives to manipulate security concerns for partisan gain.
In other words, the Court engages in cost-benefit analysis without costs.
Nor is it clear that the actual degree of government expertise makes the
risk of error in national security matters any smaller than in other policy
domains. To the contrary, recent accounts of post-9/11 policy underscore
institutional blundering, myopia, and catastrophic miscalculation through the
past decade. 7 4 The Court, on the other hand, overstates the case for suspicion
of campaign finance regulation. In Arizona Free Enterprise, for example, it
effectively applied a presumption of skepticism predicated on a fear of
legislators' incumbency-protection motives to measures adopted by popular
referendum, where legislators' self-dealing motives play no role. 75 A logic of
comparative institutional advantage, in short, cannot reconcile the differences

69. See, e.g., HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 29 (discussing judicial deference toward executive
decisions concerning national security and foreign affairs).
70. Id. at 2727.
71. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
72. See. e.g.. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604. 637, 644 n.9
(1996) (Thomas. J.. dissenting) ("[H]istory demonstrates that the most significant effect of
election reform has been not to purify public service, but to protect incumbents .... ).
73. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the
Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (2004) (recounting history).
74. See, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America
and al-Qaeda 120 (2011) (characterizing "President Bush's extralegal approach to the war on
terrorism" as "unnecessary and counterproductive").
75. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2845
(Kagan, J.. dissenting) (emphasizing democratic credentials of public financing system
invalidated in that case).
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between the two lines of cases.
To summarize, the Roberts Court's scrutiny of political speech regulation
encompasses starkly distinct kinds of factual inquiry. Although recent studies
of heightened scrutiny have identified some of that variance, 7 6 they have not
explored its normative justifications. Attention to the divergent approaches to
First Amendment scrutiny of political speech regulation in the Roberts Court
suggests that the variance observed in that domain is at best undertheorized
and at worst unjustified.
III.
If the Roberts Court's deployments of First Amendment scrutiny have a
plural and inconstant character, they are also characterized by important
doctrinal commonalities. Recall that in Part 1, 1 emphasized parallels between
the doctrinal structure in the campaign finance and national security cases, in
particular the doctrinal line between coordinatedand independent action. The
division between more and less protected speech in both domains, that is, is
drawn at the border between coordinated speech and independent speech,
making it easier for government to penalize speech in association with others
than to punish discrete and independent speech. 7 7 But does this doctrinal
equality cash out as equal protection for different sorts of speakers? Formal
symmetry of doctrinal protection, I suggest here, hides differential downstream
effects on speakers' options and the government's regulatory options. What in
the campaign finance context weakens government and empowers speakers has
the opposite effect in the national security context, where it shifts authority
from private to public hands.
In the campaign finance context, it has long been argued that drawing a
line between permissible regulation of coordinated political action and a
protected zone of sheltered independent initiative has a perverse "hydraulic"
effect. 78 In other words, commentators have argued that campaign funding
stops flowing via actors such as candidates and parties, and instead courses
through less transparent "political action committees (PACs), the 527s, and all
the rest." 79 Extending that argument, one critique of Citizens United suggests
that the decision's "removal of longstanding restriction on independent
expenditures is causing money rapidly to return to the least regulated, least
restricted pathways." 80 Drawing a line between contributions and expenditures
in the campaign finance context thus saps government's ability to regulate
comprehensively in a way that responds to possible circumvention.81

76. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 829. 845 (presenting data).
77. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 45, at 1006 (arguing that historical First Amendment protection
is explained by greater solicitude for "speech in the context of public assemblies or political
organizations").
78. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1708 (1999) (defining hydraulic account of campaign finance).
79. Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 120.
80. Kang, supra note 15, at 3.
81. This brackets the question whether disclosure is an effective substitute for direct
regulation.
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The coordinated/independent campaign finance speech line also means
that private actors still have substitutes for prohibited speech acts. 82 To be
sure, an independent expenditure may not have the specific expressive content
of a contribution to a party or candidate. But a person or corporation barred
from making a contribution, whether their motives are good or bad, has a ready
substitute in the form of independent expenditures. Wishing to aid a candidate
or party, a well-motivated speaker will frequently be able to identify campaign
messages that benefit the favored entity even absent coordination. An illmotivated (and sufficiently wealthy) speaker seeking to create a relationship of
dependency or privileged access can also use expenditures to that end, albeit
with each dollar being perhaps marginally less effective than a dollar of
contribution. 8 3
The effects of the coordinated speech/independent expenditure line on the
speech at issue in HLP are almost at the opposite pole from those observed in
the campaign finance context. Use of coordination to demarcate bounds to
protected speech expands the authority of the government because the range of
possible substitutions for either well-intentioned or ill-intentioned actors is
small. Recall that the HLP plaintiffs sought to teach and advise designated
groups about international law and political advocacy. 84 It is hard to see how
the HLP plaintiffs could substitute these necessarily coordinated actions with
independent speech. It would be too quick to say they could simply write
books or blog on the topic. (By that logic, law professors should pack up shop
today and leave students to Gilberts and Emanuels.85) Pedagogy conducted in
person, like speech accomplished in unison with like-minded others, has a
value that likely outpaces its close competitors. At the same time, illintentioned actors, who wish to aid an FTO's terrorism by subventing its
nonviolent activities, also have no plausible substitute. The full spectrum of
acts they wish to engage in is prohibited by the material support law. Potential
speakers in the national security domain, unlike political actors laboring under
the current campaign finance dispensation, cannot plausibly substitute out of
the regulated domain of speech for either good or bad reasons. Use of
coordination to limn the edges of protected speech in the security context
therefore expands the outer fringe of the government's regulatory authority
and, as a result, predictably reduces the aggregate volume of both good and
bad private speech-precisely the opposite of what is observed in the
campaign finance context.
In passing, it bears notice that the narrowing gyre of constitutional
protection instigated by HLP can also be discerned in its effect on the rule
against "guilt by association." That protection took doctrinal form as a

82. In other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, the availability of "ample alternative
channels for communication" is part of the formal doctrinal framework. Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y.. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Conmm'n of N.Y.. 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (describing doctrinal
framework for time, place, and manner restrictions).
83. For an example of a campaign contribution being viewed as having a corrupting effect,
see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc.. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
84. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2010).
85. Perhaps they should. This too might be socially desirable in a way I am too biased to
perceive.
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prohibition on the criminalization of membership absent evidence of a specific
intent to further an organization's illegal aims. 86 The HLP Court made short
work of the specific intent rule. It argued, a bit tautologically, that § 2339B
"does not criminalize mere membership," but rather only material support. 87
After HLP, the rule against guilt by association thus only reaches "mere"
membership. If a member teaches another member about international law or
political advocacy, if they coordinate advocacy to ensure consistency, or if
they offer a penny in dues, constitutional protection peels away. By revealing
the "guilt by association" rule to be only penurious shelter against state
penalties, the HLP Court clarified how small the domain of protected political
speech is when a trace of political subversion is in play.8 8
In sum, formal homology of doctrinal protection in the campaign finance
and national security domains hides functional dissonance. For practical
purposes, a coordination boundary renders the state's reach on campaign
finance matters significantly underinclusive in relation to the state's putative
goals. By contrast, the identical doctrinal rule applied to national security
matters yields a governmental grasp that is overinclusive in relation to the
state's notional goals in that domain. By adopting a coordination boundary to
protected speech, campaign finance cases assume no regulatory overbreadth is
acceptable, while national security cases take overbreadth to be self-evidently
acceptable.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the Roberts Court's political speech cases first and
foremost finds a striking divergence between the Court's magnanimous
gestures of broad deference to elected actors in the national security domain
and its beady-eyed skepticism in the campaign finance context. That stark
contrast cannot be explained on doctrinal or comparative institutional
competence grounds alone. Rather, it reflects an implicit normative judgment
about policy priorities related to political speech that is only half-aired for
public inspectation. The Court's consistent use of a coordination/independent
speech line also has subtly divergent effects in different domains. The net
consequence of the Court's sometimes consistent/sometimes inconsistent
approach to political speech is a soft pressure in favor of speakers and forms of
speech of which the Court approves. Far from acting as an umpire in these
speech cases, 89 therefore, the Court appears to be in the business of pursuing a

86. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961) (discussing constitutional
limitations on criminalizing association).
87. HLP. 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
88. Accord David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 233 ("[A]ssociation would be an empty formality
without the conduct that brings people together-meeting, raising funds, engaging in volunteer
work, and the like-and therefore to limit the right of association to the formal act of joining a
group would eviscerate the right.").
89. See. e.g.. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts. Jr.) ("[M]y job [is] to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch
or bat.").
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singularly normative vision of the democratic order packaged with an implicit
hierarchy of more or less legitimate speakers, all of whom are notionally
sheltered by the First Amendment. By building these judgments into a
hermetic doctrinal framework, the Justices can exercise influence in oblique
and indirect ways. Their normative judgments need never be fully articulated
or defended, but cloaked in concealing robes of constitutional diction.
Whatever one thinks the appropriate role of courts in a constitutional
democracy should be, it is hard to discern how this could be the best way to
delineate a constitutionally protected domain for political speech.
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